faith and doubt and scholarship (part 2)

A very different perspective on the previous questions occurs to me.

A friendly theologian explained to a member of the housegroup the difference between the assumptions made by scholarship and the assumptions made by faith.  Hence, the confessing student approaches the text with the general assumption of truth; the unbelieving - or sceptical - mind-set requires proof.  

And that in turn reminded me of a contrast someone made between the Oxford Theology Faculty - which sets out to be academic and objective - and the confessing faculties  of some Universities, particularly (when mentioned) those in Switzerland.  In the latter, we would find a generally very different approach to these questions.  Indeed, the point was made that in the Oxford faculty, the question "how would the Catholics approach this" is a good one; in the Protestant confessing faculty in Geneva, the same question would be inadmissible and irrelevant.

And I'm left wondering which actually makes for better scholarship.  The scientist in me says that the approach which is sceptical and aspires to be objective is best.  But I wonder if that extends generally.  Let us leave aside silly arguments about scepticism in the study of anthropogenic climate change.  I wonder how many non-socialists you find studying Marxist economic theory.    I wonder how many misogynists you find in women's' studies.   I wonder how many Platonists you find studying intuitionistic logic.  And so much else besides.

I may be mistaken, but we tend to assume that people are allowed to hold worldviews consistent with the research they undertake.  But for students of religion it's not so good.  Or is it?